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1. Introduction
The impact of government-sponsored training programs has been extensively studied in
the past couple of decades.1 In many countries, such programs have become an integral
part of public policies aiming at enhancing self-sufficiency among vulnerable groups. In
most cases program costs have escalated as they have become more comprehensive and
more systematically used. Not surprisingly, policy makers have shown renewed interest in
obtaining accurate and reliable estimates of their efficacy.
The discussions surrounding the efficacy or desirability of training programs rest on complex
methodological issues. The main concern lies with proper treatment of an individual’s
decision to participate in such programs. Severe biases may arise if unobserved individual
characteristics that affect the decision to participate are somehow related to the unobservables
that affect outcomes on the labour market. Two approaches have been proposed in
the evaluation literature to address the so-called “self-selection” issue. The first is the
“experimental approach”, based on random assignment of applicants into treatment or
control groups. The second is the “non-experimental”, or “econometric approach”, and relies
on non-random samples of participants and non-participants. Each approach tackles the
self-selection issue from a different angle, but the relative merit of each is still the subject of
debate [see Heckman & Smith (1995), Burtless (1995), Ham & LaLonde (1996), Keane (2010),
Leamer (2010)].
Most would argue that the “experimental” approach is best suited to eliminate self-selection
biases and provide adequate mean program impacts, however measured. Yet, recently this
view has been challenged by Ham & LaLonde (1996) in their important paper.2 In essence
they argue that random assignment between control and experimental groups provides an
1 See Heckman et al. (1999) for a detailed survey.
2 A number of papers have found evidence of biases in randomized field experiments. See Card &
Hyslop (2005), Card & Hyslop (2009), Brouillette & Lacroix (2010), Kamionka & Lacroix (2008), Crépon
et al. (2011).
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adequate short-term mean program impact. On the other hand, the treatment and controls
experiencing subsequent spells of employment and unemployment are most likely not
random subsets of the initial groups because the sorting process is very different for the two.
In other words, random assignment does not guarantee that long-termmean program impacts
are void of any systematic biases.
In most countries, experimental evaluation of training programs is impracticable due to a
lack of appropriate data. Analysts must rely on multi-state transition models. An additional
difficulty in using these data is that program participation must be modeled explicitly. Many
recent papers have nevertheless managed to successfully model complex transition patterns
using such data (Gritz (1993), Bonnal et al. (1997), Mealli et al. (1996), Brouillette & Lacroix
(2011), Fougère et al. (2010), Blasco, Crépon & Kamionka (2009)). Most papers are limited to
three separate states of the labour market: employment, unemployment (non-employment)
and training.3 In many cases data limitations do not allow identification of any more
states. In other cases, analysts purposely focus on few states to keep the statistical model
tractable. Indeed, when the data is drawn from stock samples, as is often the case when
using administrative data, the statistical model must account for so-called “initial conditions”
problems. This usually adds considerable complexity to an already involved statistical
model.4 On the other hand, many have questioned the appropriateness of focusing on few
labour market states (Heckman & Flinn (1983), Jones & Riddell (1999)).
This chapter investigates the impact of government training programs aimed at poorly
educated Canadian male welfare recipients. It should be stressed at the outset that in Canada,
as in many European countries, the welfare system aims at supporting individuals without
income and who are not entitled to any other social security benefits, irrespective of age.5
As such, it acts as a safety net for unemployed workers who do not qualify for benefits,
or who have exhausted their unemployment benefits. Many programs are available to
assist these long term unemployed and those with few skills increase their employability.
Understandably, a considerable proportion of program resources has been targeted towards
the youths in the past decade. Yet, many have questioned the ability of traditional programs
to address the problem [OECD, 1998]. The aim of this chapter is precisely to investigate the
impact of these programs in enhancing the self-sufficiency of young males welfare claimants,
a particular disadvantaged group (see Beaudry & Green (2000)).
The empirical strategy is similar to that used by Gritz (1993), Bonnal et al. (1997) and
Brouillette & Lacroix (2011) in that we explicitly account for selectivity into the training
programs. It relies on a rich dataset that tracks the transitions of a large number of individuals
on a weekly basis across seven different states of the labour market. These states include
employment, unemployment, welfare, out of the labour force (OLF), two separate welfare
training programs, and unemployment training programs. In all, as many as 24 different
transitions are allowed in the model. The sample is drawn from the population of welfare
3 One notable exception is Bonnal et al. (1997) who consider as many as 6 different different
states: permanent employment, temporary employment, public policy employment (training),
unemployment, out-of-labour-force (non-employment), and an absorbing state (attrition).
4 Two biases are likely to result from stock samples: (1) length-bias; (2) inflow-rate bias. The former may
arise because lengthy spells are more likely to be ongoing at the time the sample is chosen. The latter is
related to the fact that the probability of being sampled is related to the probability of starting a fresh
spell at time the sample is chosen. See Gouriéroux & Monfort (1992) and Van den Berg et al. (1994) for
a detailed analysis.
5 Individuals must be aged over 18 to qualify for benefits, although single parents less than 18 still qualify.
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recipients that experienced a spell at any time between 1987 and 1993 in the province of
Québec, Canada. To be included in the sample, individuals had to be aged 18 or 19 at any
time during that period and to have less than a high-school degree. Sample stratification is
used to avoid over-parameterization of the statistical model that would result if too many
exogenous variables had to be controlled for.
By merging various administrative data files we can recreate complete individuals’ histories
on the labour market back to age 16, the legal school-leaving age in Canada. Consequently,
each individual in our sample is necessarily observed in the OLF state at the beginning of
his history. This sampling scheme thus removes the necessity to control for stock sample
biases and has the additional benefit of providing rich transition patterns over a relatively
long sample frame.
The econometric model is built on continuous labour market transitions processes and
allows entry rates into each state to depend on observed and unobserved heterogeneity
components. Heterogeneity terms can be destination-specific, origin-specific or both. In all
cases, correlation across heterogeneity terms is allowed. We further investigate the sensitivity
of the parameter estimates to various distributions of the heterogeneity components. When
parametric distribution functions are used, the model is estimated by Simulated Maximum
Likelihood (SML).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed description
of the data. Section 3 discusses the econometric model and the various statistical assumption
regarding the distributions of the heterogeneity terms. Section 4 reports our empirical
findings. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
2. Data description
The basic data used for this study are drawn from the caseload records of Québec’s Ministère
de la Solidarité sociale. The files contain information on all individuals who have received
welfare benefits at some time between January 1987 and December 1993. In particular, the
start dates and end dates of each welfare and welfare training spells are recorded in the files.
The welfare program contains special provisions for those who are indisposed for work due to
mental or physical impediments. These individuals are not included in the sample. Thus the
final sample comprises only individuals who have no handicap or only a minor, intermediate,
or temporary physical handicap. Furthermore, they are fit to work.
The welfare administrative files contain no information on employment or unemployment
spells. Our sample was thus linked to the Status Vector files (SV) and the Record of
Employment (ROE) files, both under the aegis of Human Resources Development Canada.
These files contain very detailed weekly information on insured unemployment spells and
employment spells, respectively. The start dates and end dates of each spell are recorded
in these files. Similar information is available with respect to training spells administered
under the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program. Merging all three administrative files
allows us to define seven different states on the labour market. Aside from the welfare,
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unemployment and employment states, we can identify two separate welfare training states
and one unemployment training state.6
The focus of this chapter is on poorly educated youngmen. Thus to be included in the sample,
an individual had to be either 18 or 19 years of age at any time between 1987 and 1993 and have
completed less than 11 years of schooling over the sample period. A high-school degree in
Québec usually entails at least 12 years of schooling. In principle, then, none of the individuals
in our sample has earned a high-school diploma. With these selection criteria the final sample
contains 3068 individuals.
The upper panel of Table 1 provides summary statistics for individuals who have not
participated in a training program. The lower panel presents similar statistics for program
participants. In the latter case, the mean durations in either employment, unemployment or
welfare are calculated both before and after training. An examination of the table reveals
that the two groups are very similar in terms of their observable characteristics; They both
have the same average age and nearly identical schooling levels. Yet, there are significant
differences in their respective labour market experiences. For instance, non-trainees have
longer spells in each of the three states reported in the table. On the whole, the proportion of
time non-trainees spend employed is slightly larger than that of trainees prior to training. On
the other hand, once they have had training, the proportion of time trainees spend employed
becomes larger than that of non-trainees. This increase stems from the fact that the average
employment duration decreases proportionately less that the average duration of welfare and
unemployment spells. Taken at face value, this would suggest training programs benefit
somewhat to welfare recipients.
Recall that only individuals who experienced a welfare spell between 1987 and 1993 and who
were aged 18 or 19 during that period are included in the sample. Those who are 18 or 19 years
of age in January 1987 may have already been on the labour market for 2–3 years at most. In
order to recreate their complete labour market histories as of the age of 16, it is necessary in
some cases to go back as early as January 1984.7 The start date and end date of each spell is
used to create individual histories on the labour market. Overlaps between states are frequent
and are not necessarily the result of coding errors. It may well be, for example, that a welfare
spell and a work spell overlap. Program designs do not forbid this. In principle, such overlaps
could be redefined as a separate state. Given the number of possible states, it is simply not
6 The welfare files contain information dating back to 1979 and ending in December 1993. The SV files
contains information beginning in January 1987 and ending in December 1996. Finally, The ROE
files contain information ranging from January 1975 to December 1996. The analysis focuses on the
1987–1993 period due to data limitations.
7 Data concerning unemployment spells are available only as of January 1987. Consequently, a small
proportion of unemployment spells occurring prior to 1987 may be wrongly coded as out of the labour
force (OLF). Two factors lead us to believe that the proportion of such spells is likely insignificant. First,
the large majority of individuals who were 18 or 19 years of age in the years 1990 and beyond where
in the OLF, the employment or the welfare states between 16 and 19. Second, of those individuals, the
majority who had an employment spell would not have qualified for UI benefits given the eligibility
rules that prevailed between 1984 and 1987.
A similar problem arises with respect to employment spells. Indeed, spells that were ongoing in
December 1993 will not show up in the ROE files until they are terminated. To avoid misclassifying
these spells as OLF, the ROE files are searched as late as December 1996. Given the average length
of employment spells reported in Table 1, it is very unlikely that many employment spells that were
ongoing in December 1993 will still be ongoing as late as December 1996, and thus wrongly classified
as OLF.
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Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Individual without training
Age when entering the sample 19.92 1.84
Education 9.84 1.03
Duration of employment episodes (weeks)† 26.15 30.47
Duration of welfare episodes (weeks)† 35.63 34.43
Duration of unemployment episodes (weeks)† 39.90 11.99
Duration of OLF episodes (weeks)† 42.99 50.95
Proportion of time employed (weeks)‡ 0.18
Number of observations 1165
Individual with training
Age when entering the sample 19.77 (1.95)
Education 9.72 (1.03)
Before training After training
Duration of employment episodes (weeks)† 24.26 37.13 17.44 18.25
Duration of welfare episodes (weeks)† 54.90 54.86 35.14 51.09
Duration of unemployment episodes (weeks)† 41.25 14.41 35.73 16.83
Duration of OLF episodes (weeks)† 30.78 38.86 18.66 21.16
Proportion of time employed (weeks)‡ 0.17 0.16
Number of observations 1903
Table 1. Sample Characteristics
† Calculated from non censored episodes.
‡ Calculated from mean duration in employment, unemployment, welfare and OLF.
reasonable to allow these overlaps in the analysis. It was decided that, as a rule, starting dates
would have precedence over ongoing spells. Thus an ongoing spell with known end date is
truncated whenever a new state starts prior to the end date.8
The 3 068 individuals in our sample experienced as many as 31 422 spells over the sample
period. Table 2 presents all the transitions that occurred at any given point in the sample
period. The table identifies seven separate states on the labour market. Welfare Training
includes various job search assistance programs as well as skill enhancing programs aimed
at welfare recipients. The Job-Reentry Program (JRP) is an on-the-job training program also
aimed at welfare recipients. Under this program, participants do not receive benefits but a
(subsidized) salary from a regular employer.9 JRP is treated separately because contrary to
other programs most participants qualify for unemployment benefits upon completion. UI
is a state in which individuals receive unemployment benefits. Individuals that do not work
and that do not qualify for benefits are treated as out of the labour force (OLF) for the purpose
of this study. It must thus be kept in mind that UI is not necessarily akin to unemployment in
the usual sense. UI Training comprises a series of training programs aimed at UI claimants.
The OLF state is the complement of all other states. It includes full-time students, non-entitled
unemployed individuals and individuals that are truly out of the labour force.
Table 2 reveals interesting dynamics on the labour market. For instance, the majority of
welfare spells end either in employment, in welfare training or OLF. Likewise, welfare training
spells end either in welfare, in employment or in OLF. Interestingly, most JRP participants
enter regular employment upon completion of their program. Very few enter UI even though
8 Preliminary analysis was also conducted giving the end date precedence over the start date of a new
spell. The resulting transitions matrices and average durations are very robust to this strategy.
9 Non-profit organizations have to pay a symbolic 1$ per working day. The participants receive regular
benefits.
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Destination Welfare Welfare JRP U.I. U.I. Employment OLF
Origin Training Training
Welfare 0 1809 140 88 0 1851 1134
Welfare Training 432 0 67 6 0 438 306
JRP 21 4 0 7 0 192 29
U.I. 374 38 2 292 111 1380 1404
U.I. Training 2 1 0 114 0 16 2
Employment 1002 229 35 2918 41 2004 4662
OLF 2614 235 9 523 2 3815 0
Table 2. Frequency of Transitions Between States
most qualify for benefits. Other transitions are as expected, except perhaps for UI training.
Indeed, the majority of participants return to UI upon completion of their program and very
few find regular employment. A number of cells contain few or no observations. The empty
cells are consistent with program or policy parameters that prevent a number of transitions
to occur or are a consequence of our definitions of the various states.10 Only transitions
comprising more than 75 observations will be considered in the econometric model. This
leaves a total of 24 transitions to be modeled explicitly.
The transitions on the labour market have three essential dimensions: the state of origin, the
state of destination and the duration in any a given state. Table 2 provides useful information
on the first two dimensions. One way to represent all three dimensions simultaneously is
to look at the distribution of the sample across all seven states on a weekly basis. This
distribution synthesizes both the transitions across states and the mean duration in each.
Figure 1 plots the proportion of individuals in each of the seven states on a weekly basis.
The top portion of the figure traces out the proportion of individuals in non-training
states (welfare, unemployment, employment, OLF), and the bottom portion traces out the
proportions in training states (UI training, welfare training and JRP). There are two distinct
features that arise in January 1987 in the top portion of the figure. First, the proportion of
individuals in OLF is relatively high. This partly reflects a cohort effect. In January 1987, our
sample comprises only individuals that are 18 or 19 years of age. Not surprisingly, a large
proportion of them are either still in school or have not yet entered the labour market. As
we move rightward along the time axis, these individuals become older and new 18-19 year
old entrants join the sample. By the time we reach December 1993, the oldest individuals
are between 25–26 years of age. It does not necessarily follow that the sample’s average age
increases systematically along the time axis. Proportionately more individuals have entered
the sample in the recession years 1989–1992 than previously. Second, the proportion of
unemployed individuals is zero. As mentioned earlier, the information on unemployment
spells is only available as of January 1987. Consequently, only new spells are identifiable in
the data. Spells that were ongoing in January 1987 are classified as OLF in the figure.
The bottom portion of the figure also indicates that the proportion of individuals in JRP is zero
up until approximately January-February 1990. This program was implemented in August
10 For example, the welfare files provide information on a monthly basis. Any interruption lasting
between 1-3 weeks will not be recorded in the data. The record will show an uninterrupted sequence of
monthly benefits receipt. Thus Welfare-Welfare transitions are not identifiable in the data. On the other
hand, UI spells are recorded on a weekly basis. Unemployed workers that work a number of weeks
or hours while claiming benefits may qualify for additional benefits once they exhaust their original
entitlement. The SV files will indicate a new UI spell starting the week following exhaustion. Thus
UI-UI transitions are identifiable in the data.
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Fig. 1. Distribution Across States
Fig. 2. Distribution Across Training Programs
1989 and had too few participants in the beginning months to show up in the figure. Similarly,
participation in UI training programs is essentially zero up until February-March 1987. UI
training usually occurs after a number of weeks has been spent unemployed. Not surprisingly,
then, a certain laps of time is needed before the proportion of UI trainees is large enough to
show up in the figure. Training spells that were ongoing in January 1987 are also classified as
OLF.
A close look at Figure 1 reveals interesting patterns. First, the proportion of welfare
participants remains relatively constant between 1987 and 1989. The economic downturn of
1989 results in an steady increase in the proportion of welfare claimants until the end of 1993.
In fact, the proportion increased from 17.9% in January 1988 to 42.3% in December 1993. Such
an increase results from both a more important inflow into welfare and longer spell duration
[see Duclos et al. (1999) for details].
The proportion of employed individuals follows a very distinct seasonal pattern with peaks
occurring around June-July and troughs around January of each year. Despite these seasonal
fluctuations, the proportion of employed individuals increased from 31.2% in January 1988 to
33.5% in January 1990, and then gradually declined to 18.6% in January 1993. The proportion
of unemployed individuals is highly negatively correlated with the proportion of employed
individuals. The seasonal fluctuations almost perfectly mirror those of employment. Finally,
the proportion of individuals in the OLF state also depicts strong seasonal patterns. In January
of each year, the proportion of those in OLF increases by about 5 percentage points. It is likely
53The Impact of Government-Sponsoredraining Programs on the Lab  Mark t T ansitio s of D adv ntaged Men
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that many seasonal workers lose their job at the beginning of each year and do not qualify for
unemployment benefits.
The bottom portion of the figure shows that the proportion of individuals engaged in
government-sponsored training programs fluctuates considerably over time. A number of
new welfare training programs have been implemented in 1989. Most of these programs
aim at enhancing job search skills and usually last a few weeks. The large increase in
the proportion of welfare trainees coincide with the implementation of these programs. A
dramatic fall occurs towards the end of 1989 presumably linked to budgetary constraints
associated with the economic downturn of 1990. The proportion of participants steadily
increases thereafter and reaches its peak at the end of 1993. The proportion of UI trainees
is relatively constant throughout the whole period, with the exception of 1992. Both the UI
training programs and JRP have relatively few participants at any point in time.
The proportions of participants in the combined programs hardly reach beyond 5% over the
sample period. The fact that few individuals are engaged in formal training at any point in
time is no indication that training programs are inefficient or unattractive. Access to programs
is often limited because of insufficient resources. This lack of resources raises a fundamental
question: who gets selected into training? To the econometrician, participation in a training
program is the result of two separate unidentifiable processes. First, the participant has
undertaken the necessary steps to take part in the program. Second, the program manager
has deemed the participant eligible. These two processes are likely to be such that participants
have unobservable (to the econometrician) characteristics that are systematically different
from those of the non-participants. Fortunately, given the information at our disposal it
is possible to devise estimators that, under very general assumptions, will yield unbiased
estimates of the programs’ impacts. These estimators are presented in the next section.
3. Modeling labour market transitions
The labour market history of a given individual is represented by a sequence of n spells of
various lengths in any of K (=7) states11. Let xt be the state in which an individual is observed
to be at time t. The sequence starts at calendar time τ0 = 0 when the individual is 16 years of
age and ends at time τe (τe = December 1993). Figure 3 depicts a hypothetical sequence made
up of 3 spells of various length in 3 different states. As depicted, the individual is initially
observed in the OLF state. He enters into employment at time τ1 and eventually moves into
unemployment at time τ2. At time τe he is still in the midst of an unemployment spell.
Let τℓ denote the calendar time at which a spell in any given state ends. Each spell ℓ (1 ≤
ℓ ≤ n) is thus delimited by the start time τℓ−1 and the end time τℓ (τℓ > τℓ−1). Let uℓ be the
duration of spell ℓ (uℓ = τℓ − τℓ−1). Finally, let r denote a complete sequence from time 0 to
time τe :
r = ((u1, xτ1 ), . . . , (un−1, xτn−1 ), (un, 0)),
where un = τe − τn−1 is the duration of the last spell. The last spell of each individual is
right-censored since τn and xτn are not observed. On the other hand, the last spell must
have lasted at least τn − τn−1 units of time in state xτn−1 . Because xτn is not observed we
conventionally fix xτn = 0.
11 See Fougère & Kamionka (2008) for a more general presentation of the econometrics of transition
models.
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OLF
Emp.
0
Welfare
Wel. Tr.
JRP
UI
UI Tr.
τeτ2τ1
t
xt
✲
✻
✲
Fig. 3. Labour market history of a hypothetical individual.
The sequence may be more compactly rewritten as:
r = (y1, . . . , yn),
where
yℓ =
{
(uℓ, xτℓ ), if 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n− 1,
(un, 0), if ℓ = n.
The initial state, x0, is the same for each individual in our sample and is exogenously
determined by school attendance laws. Consequently, there is no need to explicitly model
the initial state in which individuals are observed.
3.1 Likelihood function
Each individual contributes a sequence r = (y1, . . . , yn) to the likelihood function. The
contribution can be written conditionally on a vector of exogenous variables, z, and an
unobserved heterogeneity factor, ν.
Let lv(θ) denote the conditional contribution of the sequence r. We have,
lv(θ) =
n
∏
ℓ=1
f (yℓ | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ),
where f (yℓ | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ) is the conditional density of yℓ given y1, . . ., yℓ−1, z and ν,
and θ ∈ Θ ⊂ IRp is a vector of parameters. Naturally, the destination state of the last spell is
unknown since the duration is censored. Its contribution to the conditional likelihood function
is limited to the survivor function of the observed duration.
The random variable ν is assumed to be independently and identically distributed
across individuals, and independent from the exogenous variables z. If the unobserved
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heterogeneity can take only a finite number of values, ν1, . . . , νJ , the contribution of a sequence
r to the likelihood function is
l(θ) =
J
∑
j=1
n
∏
ℓ=1
f (yℓ | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; νj; θ) pij, (1)
where pij is the probability that the unobserved heterogeneity term takes the value νj (0 ≤
pij ≤ 1, ∑Jj=1 pij = 1).
If ν is a continuous random variable, then
l(θ) =
∫
V
n
∏
ℓ=1
f (yℓ | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ) g(ν;γ) d ν, (2)
where g(ν;γ) is a density probability function and V is the support of ν.
Furthermore, if we assume that Yℓ is independent of Y1, . . . ,Yℓ−2, given Yℓ−1 = yℓ−1, Z = z
and the value of the unobserved term ν, then
f (yℓ | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ) = f (yℓ | yℓ−1; z; ν; θ).
Given the history of the process, the joint distribution of the duration of spell ℓ and the
destination state only depends on the current state on the labour market. This assumption
will be relaxed by introducing other characteristics of the history of the process.
3.2 Modeling individual spells
In this section we focus on the conditional distribution of yℓ = (uℓ, xτℓ ), where uℓ is the
duration of the ℓth spell in state xτℓ−1 . Define u
∗
ℓ,k as the waiting time before leaving state xτℓ−1
for state xτℓ . At the end of the ℓ
th spell, the individual will enter into the state corresponding
to the smallest latent duration u∗
ℓ,k′ . We will assume that these K latent durations are
independently distributed. Thus the duration of spell ℓ is given by12
uℓ = inf
k′
u∗
ℓ,k′ .
Let f j(u | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ) denote the probability density function (p.d.f.) of the latent
duration u∗
ℓ,j, given the history of the process up to time τℓ−1, ν and covariates z. Let Sj(u |
y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ) be the corresponding survivor function:
Sj(u | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ) =
∫ +∞
u
f j(s | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ) d s.
12 If the transition from state i to state j cannot be observed, we assume that the corresponding latent
distribution is defective and set a probability mass equal to one on +∞.
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The conditional joint density of the duration of spell ℓ and the destination state k is given by
the following expression
f (u, k|y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ) = fk(u | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ)
K
∏
j=1
j =k
Sj(u | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ),
= hk(u|y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ) S(u|y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ),
where hk(u | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ) is the hazard function associated with the latent duration u∗ℓ,k
and S(u | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ) is the survivor function of the duration of the ℓth spell. Because
the latent durations are assumed to be conditionally independent we have
S(u | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ) =
K
∏
j=1
Sj(u | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ),
where u ≥ 0. The expression represents the conditional probability that the duration of spell ℓ
is at least equal to u or, equivalently, that all latent durations are at least equal to u. Therefore,
the conditional contribution of a given sequence to the likelihood function is:
lv(θ) =
n
∏
ℓ=1
K
∏
k=1
hk(u | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ)δℓ,k Sk(u | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ),
where δℓ,k is equal to 1 if the individual enters into state k at the end of spell ℓ and to 0
otherwise :
δℓ,k =
{
1, if xτℓ = k,
0, otherwise,
ℓ = 1, . . . , n.
3.3 Unobserved heterogeneity
So far the discussion surrounding the unobserved heterogeneity components has voluntarily
been kept general. The use of maximum likelihood procedures requires that we specify
distribution functions for these components. Most applications rely on the work of Heckman
& Singer (1984) and approximate arbitrary continuous distributions using a finite number of
mass points (see Gritz (1993), Ham & Rea (1987), Doiron & Gorgens (2008)). More recent
papers use richer specifications that allow the heterogeneity terms to be correlated across
states (see Bonnal et al. (1997), Ham & LaLonde (1996)). These specifications are sometimes
referred to as single or two-factor loading distributions and are also based on a finite set of
mass points. In our work, we wish to investigate the robustness of the parameter estimates
to various distributional assumptions. We will use two and three-factor loading distributions
as in the aforementioned papers. Additionally, we will investigate the consequences on the
slope parameters of using various continuous distributions instead of the usual finite sets of
mass points.
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To fix ideas, let w = (w1, . . . ,wK) be a vector of unobserved heterogeneity variables, with wk a
destination-specific component (k = 1, . . . ,K). Ideally, the joint distribution of the unobserved
heterogeneity terms should not be independent.
Consider first a two-factor loading model (see Van den Berg (1997)) such that
wk = exp(ak v1 + bk v2), (3)
where v1 ∈ {−2, c2}, v2 ∈ {c1, c2}, bk ∈ IR, ak = 1I[k ≥ 2] and b1 = 1. The random variables
v1 and v2 are assumed to be independent. The constraints imposed on the support of v1 and
v2 are sufficient for identification and to allow the correlation between log(wk) and log(wk′ )
to span the interval [−1; 1].
Moreover, assume that
Prob[(V1,V2) = (v
0
1, v
0
2)] =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
p2, if v01 = −2 and v02 = c1,
p ∗ (1− p), if v01 = −2 and v02 = c2,
(1− p) ∗ p, if v01 = c2 and v02 = c1,
(1− p)2, if v01 = c2 and v02 = c2,
(4)
where c1, c2 ∈ IR and the probability p is defined as
p =
exp(d)
1+ exp(d)
,
where d ∈ IR is a parameter.
The correlation between log(wk) and log(wk′ ), denoted ρk,k′ , is
ρk,k′ =
ak ak′σ2v1 + bk bk′ σ
2
v2√
a2k σ
2
v1 + b
2
k σ
2
v2
√
a2k′ σ
2
v1 + b
2
k′ σ
2
v2
, (5)
where k, k′ = 1, . . . ,K and σ2vj is the variance of vj, j=1,2. A positive correlation coefficient
between wj and wk implies that those who are likely to have high transition rates between any
given state and state j will also have high transition rates into state k.
A two-factor loading model with two independent heterogeneity terms with common
continuous distribution can also be derived from this specification. As before, let wk denote
the heterogeneity term for destination k:
wk = exp(ak v1 + bk v2),
where ak and bk are parameters (ak = 1I[k ≥ 2] and b1 = 1).
Here v1 and v2 are assumed to be independently and identically distributed. Let q(v;γ) be
the p.d.f. of v1 and v2. The correlations between log(wk) and log(wk′ ) are given by the same
expression as in (5). In principle, q(v;γ) represents any well-behaved distribution function.
The above specification can be further generalized to a three-factor loading model with
common continuous distribution. In this case the unobserved components depend on the
destination state as well as the current state. Let wj,k be specific to the transition between
origin j and destination k.
wj,k = w
′
j wk = exp(a
′
j v3 + b
′
j v2)× exp(ak v1 + bk v2), (6)
where a′j, b
′
j, ak and bk are parameters (a
′
j = ak = 1I[k ≥ 2], b1 = 1).
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In this three-factor loading model, the correlation between destination states k and k′ is
ρk,k′ =
ak ak′ + bk bk′√
a2k + b
2
k
√
a2k′ + b
2
k′
. (7)
This correlation has the same interpretation as in the two-factor loading model.
On the other hand, the correlation between the two origin states j and j′ is given by
ρj,j′ =
a′ j a′ j′ + b′ j b′ j′√
a′2j + b′
2
j
√
a′2j′ + b′
2
j′
. (8)
A positive correlation indicates that those who have short spells in state j are likely to have
short spell duration in state j′ as well.
Finally, the correlation between origin state j and destination state k is given by
ρk,j =
b′ j bk√
a′2j + b′
2
j
√
a2k + b
2
k
, (9)
where j, j′, k, k′ = 1, . . . ,K. This correlation is somewhat trickier to interpret. A positive
coefficient indicates that those who are likely to have short spell duration in state j are also
more likely to enter state k. Conversely, those who are more likely to have short spell duration
in state j are less likely to enter state k.
3.4 Specification of conditional hazard functions
Assume an individual is observed in state j during spell ℓ (i.e. xτℓ−1 = j). Let ψ(j, k) denote
the heterogeneity term for destination k, given the individual is in state j. There are two
possibilities:
ψ(j, k) =
{
wk, in the two-factor loading model,
wj,k, in the three-factor loading model.
The conditional hazard function for transition (j, k) is given by
hj,k(u | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; ν; θ) = h0j,k(u; θ) ϕ(y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; θ) ψ(j, k), (10)
where ϕ is a positive function of the exogenous variables and the sequence r, h0j,k(u; θ) is the
baseline hazard function for transition (j, k), and ψ(j, k) > 0.
We have considered three alternative conditional specifications for the baseline hazard
functions. For each transition, we have chosen among the following competing specifications
on the basis of non-parametric kernel estimations (see Fortin et al. (1999a)):
1. Log-logistic Distribution
The baseline hazard function is
h0j,k(u; θ) =
β j,k αj,k u
αj,k−1
(1+ β j,k u
αj,k )
,
αj,k, β j,k ∈ IR+.
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If αj,k > 1 then the hazard function is increasing then decreasing with respect of u. If
αj,k ≤ 1 then the hazard function is decreasing.
2. Piecewise-Constant Hazard Model
The expression of the baseline hazard function is
h0j,k(u; θ) = αj,k1I[u < u
0
1] + β j,k1I[u
0
1 ≤ u < u02] + γj,k1I[u02 ≤ u],
where αj,k, β j,k,γj,k ∈ IR+. u01 and u02 are fixed.
The baseline hazard function can be increasing then decreasing, decreasing then
increasing, strictly increasing or strictly decreasing.
3. Weibull Distribution
The baseline hazard function is
h0j,k(u; θ) = αj,k β j,k u
αj,k−1,
αj,k, β j,k ∈ IR+.
If αj,k > 1 then the hazard function is increasing with respect of u. If αj,k < 1 then the
hazard function is decreasing with respect of u and if αj,k = 1 this conditional hazard
function is constant.
3.5 Estimation
We consider three alternative specifications for the unobserved heterogeneity distribution.
1. Two-Factor Loading and Discrete Distribution
The log likelihood is
log(L(θ)) =
N
∑
i=1
log(li(θ)), (11)
where li(θ) is obtained by substituting the sequence ri = (y1,i, . . . , yni ,i) and the observed
vector of covariates zi in (1). N is the size of the sample.
In equation (1) pij is set equal to
13
pij =
⎧⎨
⎩
p2, if j = 1,
p ∗ (1− p), if j = 2, 3,
(1− p)2, if j = 4,
where p ∈ [0; 1] is a parameter. The log-likelihood is then maximized with respect of θ
(θ ∈ Θ).
2. Two-Factor Loading and Continuous Distribution
The model includes two unobserved heterogeneity terms v1 and v2 (vj > 0, j = 1, 2). We
assume these terms to be independently and identically distributed. Let q(v;γ) be the
p.d.f. of vj, j = 1, 2.
The contribution of a given realization to the likelihood function is given by equation (2),
where ν = (v1, v2)′, V = IR+ × IR+ and g(ν;γ) = q(v1;γ) q(v2;γ). The log-likelihood is
13 See section 4.
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given by equation (11), where li(θ) is the contribution to the likelihood of the sequence ri.14
Since the integral in l(θ) cannot generally be analytically computed it must be numerically
simulated.
Let lˆ(θ) denote the estimator of the individual contribution to the likelihood function. We
assume that
lˆ(θ) =
1
H
H
∑
h=1
n
∏
ℓ=1
f (yℓ | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; v1,h, v2,h; θ),
where v1,h and v2,h are drawn independently according to the p.d.f. q(v;γ). The drawings
vj,h (j = 1, 2, h = 1, . . . , H) are assumed to be specific to the individual. The parameter
estimates are obtained by maximizing the simulated log-likelihood:
log(L(θ)) =
N
∑
i=1
log(lˆi(θ)),
where lˆi(θ) is the simulated contribution of the sequence ri to the likelihood function.
The maximization of this simulated likelihood yields consistent and efficient parameters
estimates if
√
N
H → 0 when H → +∞ and N → +∞ (see Gourriéroux & Monfort
(1991)). Under these conditions, this estimator has the same asymptotic distribution as the
standardML estimator. Following Laroque & Salanié (1993), Kamionka (1998) and Edon &
Kamionka (2007) we have used 20 draws from the random distributions when estimating
the models. Using as few as 10 draws yielded essentially the same parameter estimates.
3. Three-Factor Loading and Continuous Distribution
In the three-factor loading model the conditional contribution must be integrated with
respect to the distribution of three independent unobserved heterogeneity terms. Let lˆ(θ)
denote the estimator of the individual contribution to the likelihood function. Assume
further that
lˆ(θ) =
1
H
H
∑
h=1
n
∏
ℓ=1
f (yℓ | y1, . . . , yℓ−1; z; v1,h, v2,h, v3,h; θ),
where v1,h, v2,h and v3,h are drawn independently according to the p.d.f. q(ν;γ). Once
again, the parameter estimates obtained from maximizing this function are asymptotically
efficient.
4. Estimation results
This section presents the results of fitting the models outlined in the previous section to the
data at our disposal. The estimation of such complex models is computationally demanding.
Also, a number of issues must be addressed before dwelling into the results.
4.1 Functional forms assumptions
Asmentioned in the previous section, it is necessary to specify a baseline distribution function
for each transition considered in the model. When selecting a particular functional form, a
14 In what follows, θ includes γ, the parameters of q(·).
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number of desirable properties should be sought. First, the functional form should allow a
number of different shapes of the hazard function so that various combinations of positive
and negative duration dependence are possible. Second, it should roughly follow the pattern
of transitions times found in the data. Finally, the functional forms should involve as few
parameters as possible.
Dest. Welfare Welfare JRP U.I. U.I. Emp. OLF
Origin Training Training
Welfare Exp (1) Exp (1) Exp (1) Exp (3) Exp (1)
Wel Tr Log-logis. Log-logis. Log-logis.
JRP Exp (1)
U.I. Exp (2) Exp (2) Exp (1) Exp (3) Exp (2)
U.I. Tr Exp (1)
Emp Log-logis. Weibull Log-logis. Log-logis. Log-logis.
OLF Exp (2) Exp (2) Exp (2) Exp (2)
Table 3. Baseline Hazard Functional Forms†
† “Exp” refers to exponential piecewise constant hazard model. The number of parameters are indicated
between parentheses.
The data at our disposal was analyzed in Fortin et al. (1999a) and Fortin et al. (2004) using
non-parametric kernel hazard estimators. The baseline hazard functions were chosen on
the basis of their analysis. Table 3 reports the functional form used in each of the 24
transitions considered in the model. Both the log-logistic and the piecewise constant functions
allow non-monotonic hazards. For many transitions, the empirical hazard functions initially
increase for a short period of time and then display an extended period of negative duration
dependence. The log-logistic function is best suited in these cases. When the empirical
hazard function looks relatively flat, it is preferable to use an exponential model with a
single parameter. Other non-monotone shapes are best approximated with the piecewise
constant hazard function. Monotone increasing or decreasing empirical hazard rates can be
satisfactorily approximated with a weibull distribution function.
4.2 Exogenous covariates
Most studies on labour market transitions include a number of exogenous individual-specific
and macroeconomic variables. It is thus customary to include variables such as age, sex,
education and minority status to capture behavioural differences across these groups. In this
chapter we have tried to limit the number of exogenous control variables as much as possible.
Given the unusually large number of transitions considered in the analysis, including even as
little as 10 exogenous variables would have over-parameterized the likelihood function and
rendered its estimation practically infeasible.
An alternative empirical strategy is to circumscribe the sample to relatively homogeneous
individuals in terms of observable characteristics. We have elected to concentrate our attention
on young and poorly educated men for two reasons: (1) They have fared relatively poorly
on the labour market over the past two decades (see Beaudry & Green (2000)); (2) As a
consequence of their deteriorating labour market outcomes, many have claimed welfare
benefits and have been especially targeted for training programs. Having a relatively
homogeneous sample in terms of age and education does not remove the need to control
for such variables explicitly. Our sampling scheme insures that there is little variance in age
at the start of the sample period (see Table 1). As the initial individuals become older, new
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entrants 18–19 years of age join the sample, thus increasing considerably the variance in age.
On the other hand, the sample was chosen so that educational attainment never exceeded 10
years of schooling. Consequently, the variance in education remains relatively constant over
the sample period.
We thus explicitly control for age in the regressions. Note that Gritz (1993) has found both
education and age to have little impact on any of the transitions considered in his model. The
following exogenous variables are included in the model in addition to age: minimum wage,
unemployment rate, welfare benefits, and dummy indicators for previous training under
either welfare or UI. The minimum wage and the welfare benefits are computed monthly
and deflated by the monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI). The monthly unemployment rate is
computed for men aged 25-64 for the Province of Québec. All the variables are computed at
the beginning of each spell and are assumed constant throughout the duration of individual
spells.
4.3 Parameter estimates
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates of a three-factor loading model that incorporates
a weibull distribution for the heterogeneity variables.15 The slope parameters of the
non-parametric and the (weibull) two-factor loading models are nearly identical to those
presented in Table 4 and are not reported for the sake of brevity.
Table 4 is divided into several panels. Each panel contains the parameter estimates for the
exit rates of a given state. The parameter estimates of the baseline hazard are presented first
followed by those of the control variables. The variable “Wel Tr1” is a dummy indicator that
equals 1 if the individual has experienced a welfare training spell or has participated in JRP
at any time prior to the ongoing spell, and 0 otherwise. The variable “Wel Tr2” is a dummy
indicator that equals 1 if the state just prior to the current spell was either welfare training or
JRP, and 0 otherwise. The variables “UI Tr1” and “UI Tr2” are similarly defined but pertain to
UI training programs. The inclusion of “Wel Tr11” or “UI Tr1” alone implicitly assumes that
the impact of training programs does not wear off with time nor that it accumulate with repeat
uses. Including both “Wel Tr1” and “Wel Tr2” or “UI Tr1” and “UI Tr2” allows to determine
whether recent training has more impact than previous training on current spell duration.
Both past and recent training variables are included whenever feasible.
4.3.1 Exits from welfare
The first panel of Table 4 focuses on exits fromwelfare. Exits to as many as five different states
are considered in the model. Parameters related to age indicate that as individuals get older
they are more likely to enter employment or OLF upon leaving welfare. In the latter case, this
may be an indication that they are more inclined to return to school. Increases in theminimum
wage rate increases the transitions towards welfare training, JRP and unemployment, but has
no impact on transitions into employment. This result is compatible with the results found
15 The model was also estimated using normal, student-t, χ2 and gamma distributions. The results based
on these specifications are not reported here for the sake of brevity, but are available on request. The
specification based on the weibull was preferred to all others for two reasons. First, the parameter
estimates based on theweibull distribution are very similar to those based on discrete distributions with
a finite number of mass points. Given the latter are robust to specification errors on the distribution
of the heterogeneity components (see Heckman & Singer (1984)), the weibull distribution appears to
depict similar properties. Second, as in Heckman & Singer (1984), the value of likelihood function
based on the weibull distribution is larger than those based on other distributions.
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No Het Non-Para Log-Normal Weibull Weibull Weibull
2 Factors 2 Factors 3 Factors
Welfare to Welfare Training
Baseline1 12.951† 11.769† 9.916† 9.736† 7.437† 7.511†
Replacement -41.844† -34.680† -34.591† -34.500† -30.710† -30.722†
MinimumWage 11.507† 10.464† 10.555† 10.624† 10.132† 10.127†
Unemp Rate 1.837† 0.641† 0.659† 0.659† 0.855† 0.858†
Welfare Ben. -0.267 -1.202† -1.165† -1.169† -1.058† -1.046†
Wel. Tr.3 0.133 0.126
JRP4 0.486† 0.486†
U.I. Tr.5 0.123 0.127
Welfare to JRP
Baseline1 -16.915‡ -12.068 -20.602† -21.019† 23.330† -23.004†
Replacement -2.948 10.486 11.451 11.010 14.679 14.800
MinimumWage 24.425† 20.061† 20.504† 20.511† 20.177† 19.689†
Unemp Rate 0.114 -2.402† -2.477† -2.465† -2.301† -2.304†
Welfare Ben. 1.389 0.081 0.093 0.046 0.115 0.095
Wel. Tr.3 0.562‡ 0.561‡
JRP4 -0.011 -0.039
U.I. Tr.5 0.112 0.109
Welfare to Unemployment
Baseline1 2.275 0.160 -5.840 -6.134 -3.910 -3.511
Replacement -30.577† -16.447 -15.796 -16.035 -19.417‡ -18.808‡
MinimumWage 12.777 16.201† 16.575† 16.565† 16.483† 15.791†
Unemp Rate 1.538† -0.399 -0.446 -0.451 -0.568 -0.547
Welfare Ben. 1.579‡ 0.672 0.682 0.626 0.571 0.456
Wel. Tr.3 0.232 0.210
JRP4 -2.164‡ -2.139‡
U.I. Tr.5 0.594 0.531
Welfare to Work
Baseline2 -6.268† 5.172† -1.084 -1.426 -0.781 -0.902
-6.786† 4.757† -1.501 -1.836 -1.194 -1.250
-7.623† 4.039† -2.253 -2.580 -1.941 -1.910
Replacement -0.201 -2.715 -2.268 -2.469 -3.464 -2.834
MinimumWage 6.019† -0.608 -0.470 -0.447 -0.345 -0.266
Unemp Rate -0.322† -0.106 -0.127 -0.126 -0.209 -0.219
Welfare Ben. -1.107† -1.214† -1.204† -1.231† -1.272† -1.342†
Wel. Tr.3 0.027 0.020
JRP4 -0.454† -0.436†
U.I. Tr.5 0.314 0.273
Welfare to OLF
Baseline1 -2.676 -1.632 -1.661 -1.858 -1.136 -1.025
Replacement -3.865 -6.066‡ -6.159‡ -5.847 -6.859‡ -6.669‡
MinimumWage -1.026 -1.394 -1.424 -1.268 -1.130 -1.055
Unemp Rate 0.396† 0.500† 0.484† 0.508† 0.382 0.425‡
Welfare Ben. -0.847† -0.621† -0.522† -0.590† -0.632† -0.684†
Wel. Tr.3 -0.209 -0.242
JRP4 -0.276 -0.233
U.I. Tr.5 0.708† 0.597†
Table 4. Parameter Estimates – Exits fromWelfare
1 Exponential hazard.
2 Exponential hazard – splines.
3 Dummy indicator for any previous welfare training.
4 Dummy indicator for any previous JRP.
5 Dummy indicator for any previous U.I. training.
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No Het Non-Para Log-Normal Weibull Weibull Weibull
2 Factors 2 Factors 3 Factors
Unemployment to Welfare
Baseline2 -20.617† -28.243† -29.821† -29.848† -29.184† -29.120†
-17.591† -25.197† -26.775† -26.805† -26.039† -25.969†
Replacement 22.900† 31.891† 31.726† 31.632† 31.541† 31.616†
MinimumWage -5.551 5.312† 5.125† 5.129† 3.266 3.236
Unemp Rate 1.695† 0.907‡ 0.921‡ 0.921‡ 1.084† 1.093†
Welfare Ben. 1.620† 1.289† 1.313† 1.314† 1.403† 1.401†
Wel. Tr.3 0.590† 0.583†
JRP4 -0.045 -0.046
U.I. Tr.5 2.161† 2.171†
Unemployment to Unemployment
Baseline2 -20.463† -1.743 -7.615 -7.912 -7.524 -7.390
-16.030† 2.695 -3.168 -3.473 -3.016 -2.884
Replacement 3.966 -1.913 -1.024 -1.382 -1.547 -1.442
MinimumWage 22.232† 1.669 1.197 1.309 0.371 0.192
Unemp Rate 0.901† 0.947‡ 0.981‡ 0.973‡ 1.042‡ 1.065‡
Welfare Ben. -1.245† -1.235† -1.179† -1.203† -1.161† -1.153†
Wel. Tr.3 0.315 0.338
JRP4 0.305 0.301
U.I. Tr.5 1.477† 1.473†
Unemployment to Unemployment Training
Baseline1 -2.325 -6.534 -10.807 -10.988 -10.621 -10.482
Replacement -15.630‡ -4.039 -4.201 -4.171 -5.389 -5.474
MinimumWage 4.588 11.050† 11.140† 11.207† 11.962† 11.915†
Unemp Rate 1.758 0.329 0.311 0.299 0.202 0.210
Welfare Ben. 0.934 0.160 0.192 0.203 0.190 0.203
Wel. Tr.3 -0.398 -0.408
U.I. Tr.5 -0.144 -0.146
Unemployment to Work
Baseline2 -5.570‡ 10.517† 4.550‡ 3.985 4.577‡ 4.730‡
-3.400 12.708† 6.753† 6.181† 6.788† 6.938†
Replacement -3.153 -10.825† -10.570† -10.526† -11.610† -11.669†
MinimumWage 8.237† -3.261† -3.719† -3.532† -3.364† -3.478†
Unemp Rate -0.801† -0.266 -0.225 -0.235 -0.277 -0.269
Welfare Ben. -0.683† -0.337 -0.299 -0.326 -0.342 -0.330
Wel. Tr.3 -0.385† -0.368†
JRP 4 0.150 0.156
U.I. Tr.5 0.774† 0.784†
Unemployment to OLF
Baseline2 -13.698† -10.051† -9.952† -10.042† -9.426† -9.302†
-10.723† -7.069† -6.986† -7.079† -6.418† -6.293†
Replacement 7.977† 6.497‡ 6.104‡ 6.375‡ 5.533 5.353
MinimumWage 8.652† 2.008 2.358 2.402 2.015 1.984
Unemp Rate -0.054 -0.236 -0.295 -0.305 -0.271 -0.252
Welfare Ben. -0.284 -0.390 -0.406 -0.396 -0.378 -0.361
Wel. Tr. -0.098 -0.127
JRP 0.045 0.061
U.I. Tr. 1.399† 1.353†
Table 4. Continued: Parameter Estimates – Exits from Unemployment
1 Exponential hazard.
2 Exponential hazard – splines.
3 Dummy indicator for any previous welfare training.
4 Dummy indicator for any previous JRP.
5 Dummy indicator for any previous U.I. training.
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No Het Non-Para Log-Normal Weibull Weibull Weibull
2 Factors 2 Factors 3 Factors
Work to Welfare
Baseline1 -7.102† -7.122† -7.093† -7.094† -7.066† -7.057†
1.825† 1.829† 1.823† 1.823† 1.815† 1.812†
Replacement -10.487† -7.783† -10.196† -10.328† -10.415† -10.336†
MinimumWage 0.165 1.045 0.230 0.207 0.172 0.175
Unemp Rate 1.022† 0.939† 1.002† 1.008† 1.083† 1.087†
Welfare Ben. 1.078† 0.977† 1.050† 1.050† 1.026† 1.038†
Wel. Tr.2 0.698† 0.692†
JRP3 -1.167† -1.166†
U.I. Tr.4 -0.313 -0.306
Work to Welfare Training
Baseline1 -29.322† 7.320 5.564 5.571 2.880 3.647
3.352† -0.012 -0.019 -0.020 -0.004 -0.006
Replacement -35.936† -43.508† -43.520† -43.638† -34.009† -35.355†
MinimumWage 25.433† 26.226† 26.392† 26.342† 18.898† 18.242†
Unemp Rate -0.107 -0.610 -0.623 -0.614 -0.282 -0.161
Welfare Ben. -1.249† -1.389‡ -1.380‡ -1.374‡ -0.818 -0.629
Wel. Tr.2 1.281† 1.267†
JRP3 0.510† 0.500†
U.I. Tr.4 -1.067‡ -0.996
Work to Unemployment
Baseline1 -6.340† -6.453† -6.492† -6.468† -6.474† -6.445†
0.687† 0.678† 0.671† 0.671† 0.673† 0.672†
Replacement -2.411† 7.297† -0.444 -1.208† -1.309† -1.171†
MinimumWage 3.196† 5.624† 3.772† 3.612† 3.734† 3.757†
Unemp Rate -0.805† -0.959† -0.934† -0.896† -0.898† -0.910†
Welfare Ben. -0.086 -0.436† -0.228 -0.251 -0.265‡ -0.261‡
Wel. Tr12 0.101 0.111
Wel. Tr25 -0.216 -0.214
U.I. Tr13 -0.130 -0.125
U.I. Tr26 1.524† 1.484†
Work to Work
Baseline1 -4.758† -4.722† -4.683† -4.687† -4.698† -4.713†
1.187† 1.155† 1.136† 1.143† 1.147† 1.162†
Replacement -0.583 9.910† 1.320† 0.557 0.094 0.123
MinimumWage -3.339† -1.263‡ -2.959† -3.021† -2.452† -2.467†
Unemp Rate -0.953† -1.019† -1.046† -1.036† -1.030† -1.036†
Welfare Ben. 0.013 -0.285‡ -0.122 -0.142 -0.180 -0.159
Wel. Tr12 -0.248 -0.240
Wel. Tr25 -0.122 -0.123
U.I. Tr13 0.014 0.027
U.I. Tr26 -0.667 -0.716
Work to OLF
Baseline1 -6.350‡ -6.283† -6.332† -6.336† -6.356† -6.310†
1.650† 1.626† 1.641† 1.642† 1.645† 1.628†
Replacement -0.060 -0.267 -0.480‡ -0.319 -1.205† -1.246†
MinimumWage -3.623† -3.903† -3.774† -3.811† -2.606† -2.717†
Unemp Rate -0.974† -0.916† -0.911† -0.908† -0.915† -0.877†
Welfare Ben. 0.268† 0.321† 0.317† 0.333† 0.260† 0.295†
Wel. Tr12 -0.282† -0.286†
Wel. Tr25 -0.572† -0.586†
U.I. Tr13 -0.488† -0.453†
U.I. Tr26 -1.233 -1.237
Table 4. (Continued)Parameter Estimates – Exits from Employment
1 Log-logistic.
2 Dummy indicator for any previous welfare training.
3 Dummy indicator for any previous JRP.
4 Dummy indicator for any previous U.I. training.
5 Dummy indicator for prior state: welfare training.
6 Dummy indicator for prior state: U.I. training.
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No Het Non-Para Log-Normal Weibull Weibull Weibull
2 Factors 2 Factors 3 Factors
OLF to Welfare
Baseline2 9.050† -21.852† -23.272† -23.247† -21.271† -21.201†
8.014† -22.698† -24.168† -24.150† -22.170† -22.082†
Replacement -6.865† 24.985† 24.469† 24.301† 21.054† 21.196†
MinimumWage -22.989† 10.913† 10.664† 10.630† 10.589† 10.576†
Unemp Rate 0.384† -0.425† -0.378† -0.376† -0.386† -0.396†
Welfare Ben. 1.759† -0.002 0.039 0.049 0.038 0.032
Wel. Tr.3 0.261† 0.251†
JRP4 -1.236† -1.229†
U.I. Tr.5 0.106 0.101
OLF to Welfare Training
Baseline2 17.926† -6.003† -10.899† -10.984† -8.832† -8.868†
16.876† -6.818† -11.706† -11.791† -9.634† -9.662†
Replacement -64.337† -29.309† -25.939† -25.960† -25.370† -26.066†
MinimumWage 23.722† 34.225† 36.886† 36.923† 30.886† 31.237†
Unemp Rate 1.865† 0.547 0.351 0.341 0.940 0.961
Welfare Ben. 1.757† -1.772‡ -1.824† -1.819† -1.769‡ -1.681‡
Wel. Tr.3 0.710† 0.711†
JRP4 -0.036 -0.087
U.I. Tr.5 0.105 0.201
OLF to Unemployment
Baseline2 17.926† -6.003† -10.899† -10.984† -8.832† -8.868†
16.876† -6.818† -11.706† -11.791† -9.634† -9.662†
Replacement -18.873† 10.249† 9.571† 8.979† 4.909 5.430
MinimumWage -24.418† 8.757† 8.562† 8.549† 9.187† 9.175†
Unemp Rate -1.791† -2.838† -2.892† -2.919† -2.926† -2.984†
Welfare Ben. 1.047† -0.309 -0.321 -0.326 -0.351 -0.359
Wel. Tr.3 -0.913† -0.906†
JRP4 -0.046 -0.043
U.I. Tr.5 -0.380 -0.375
OLF to Work
Baseline2 11.804† -2.367 -8.492† -8.596† -6.903† -6.977†
11.148† -2.701‡ -8.830† -8.923† -7.233† -7.313†
Replacement -6.325† 12.069† 12.465† 11.915† 9.093† 9.477†
MinimumWage -22.641† 3.718† 3.725† 3.742† 3.719† 3.664†
Unemp Rate -1.950† -2.861† -2.896† -2.934† -2.938† -2.957†
Welfare Ben. 0.098 -0.554† -0.587† -0.593† -0.596† -0.585†
Wel. Tr.3 -0.008 -0.007
JRP4 -0.612† -0.618†
U.I. Tr.5 0.130 0.151
Table 4. (Continued)Parameter Estimates – Exits from OLF
1 Exponential hazard.
2 Exponential hazard – splines.
3 Dummy indicator for any previous welfare training.
4 Dummy indicator for any previous JRP.
5 Dummy indicator for any previous U.I. training.
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No Het Non-Para Log-Normal Weibull Weibull Weibull
2 Factors 2 Factors 3 Factors
Welfare Training to Welfare
Baseline1 -4.927† -4.997† -4.951† -4.949† -4.950† -5.036†
0.508† 0.504† 0.506† 0.506† 0.506† 0.498†
Replacement 14.105† 16.989† 14.470† 14.324† 14.326† 15.040†
MinimumWage -16.050† -14.842 -15.840† -15.877† -15.893† -15.543†
Unemp Rate -0.892† -1.027† -0.939† -0.923† -0.917† -0.989†
Welfare Ben. 0.325 0.131 0.287 0.277 0.277 0.158
Welfare Training to Work
Baseline1 -3.971† -4.087† -4.107† -4.127† -4.123† -4.230†
0.277† 0.277† 0.270† 0.268† 0.268† 0.262†
Replacement -3.450† 5.666† -1.437 -1.959 -2.100 -1.484
MinimumWage 3.294† 7.772† 3.949‡ 3.702‡ 3.769‡ 3.901‡
Unemp Rate -0.957† -1.096† -0.884‡ -0.864‡ -0.857‡ -0.814
Welfare Ben. -0.619 -1.233† -1.019‡ -1.063‡ -1.060‡ -1.234†
Welfare Training to OLF
Baseline1 -5.187† -5.135† -5.140† -5.124† -5.124† -5.151†
0.403† 0.405† 0.401† 0.403† 0.403† 0.404†
Replacement -16.086† -16.959† -16.775† -16.747† -16.672† -16.234†
MinimumWage 14.358† 14.417† 13.960† 13.989† 13.957† 14.333†
Unemp Rate -0.483 -0.515 -0.430 -0.430 -0.439 -0.486
Welfare Ben. -0.219 -0.012 -0.014 0.024 0.021 -0.108
JRP to Work
Baseline2 3.612 5.668 -3.143 -2.889 -3.037 -4.420
Replacement -14.331† -8.461 -5.173 -5.844 -5.767 -5.134
MinimumWage 6.240 9.809 11.792 11.488 11.655 11.941‡
Unemp Rate -0.276 -0.877 -1.024 -1.035 -1.047 -1.104
Welfare Ben. -0.581 -1.467 -1.438 -1.731 -1.731 -0.670
Unemployment Training to Unemployment
Baseline2 5.363 7.502† 1.457 0.920 1.233 0.822
MinimumWage -20.820† -11.370† -9.906† -9.984† -10.577† -10.712†
Unemp Rate 0.480 1.571‡ 1.452 1.525 1.559 1.544
Welfare Ben. -0.084 0.369 0.157 0.231 0.213 0.506
Table 4. (Continued) Parameter Estimates – Exits from Training
1 Log-logistic.
2 Exponential hazard.
in a recent paper by Fortin et al. (2004). In that paper it was found using a similar sample
that increases in the minimum wage rate increased exits from welfare. Since the transition
state was not known, this was interpreted as evidence that firms were not constrained by
the minimum wage rate. Instead, an increase in the latter was interpreted as attracting a
number of welfare claimants onto the labour market. The results reported here provide a
completely different story. Indeed, it appears that increases in the minimumwage rate induce
welfare claimants to increase their employability status but does not translate into a larger
number being employed. Quite to the contrary, the increased transition rates from welfare
to unemployment suggest that a number of individuals who were working while claiming
welfare benefits may have lost their job following the increase in the minimum wage rate.
Increases in the unemployment rate translate into smaller transition rates into JRP. This result
is compatible with the fact that welfare claimants may be less motivated to increase their
employability when job prospects diminish. Alternatively, firms may also be less inclined to
hire trainees under the JRP program when the unemployment rate rise.
68 Advances in Econometrics - Theory and Applications
www.intechopen.com
The Impact of Government-Sponsored Training Programs on the Labor Market Transitions of Disadvantaged Men 23
As expected, increases in welfare benefits decrease the exit rates from welfare. The result is
statistically significant in transitions towards training, work and OLF states. A similar finding
was reported by Fortin and Lacroix in the aforementioned paper.
Past occurrences of welfare training are generally not very beneficial to the men in our
sample. They are associated with higher transition rates into welfare training and lower rates
into employment and OLF. The impact is larger for recent occurrences, which suggests that
participation in such training programs may convey a bad signal to potential employers. On
the other hand, past occurrences of UI training has little impact on the exits from welfare.
4.3.2 Exits from unemployment
The next panel of the table focuses on the transitions from unemployment. Most parameter
estimates that are statistically significant have the expected sign a priori. For instance, it is
found that as individuals get older they aremore likely to exit unemployment for employment
and less for welfare. Similarly, increases in the minimum wage rate leads to higher transition
rates into UI training but lower rates into employment. These results are consistent with those
found with respect to exits from welfare.
Other results presented in the panel indicate that unemployed individuals are more likely
to experience a new unemployment spell or to enter welfare and are less likely to enter
employment whenever the unemployment rate increases. Presumably, a number of UI
claimants can not find employment and therefore exhaust their benefits. The social security
system in Canada entitles them to welfare benefits upon exhaustion of UI benefits. On the
other hand, increases in welfare benefits increase the transition rates into welfare and lower
those into unemployment and employment. These results suggest that the transitions towards
employment are very sensitive to both policy variables, i.e. welfare benefits and minimum
wages, as well as to the state of the economy as proxied by the unemployment rate.
A number of parameter estimates relating to the training dummy variables are statistically
significant. Once again, previous participation in welfare training increases the likelihood of
enteringwelfare upon leaving unemployment and decreases that of entering employment. On
the other hand, recent UI training participation appears to have a conflicting impacts. Indeed,
UI claimants are more likely to enter either welfare or UI upon leaving unemployment but
are also more likely to enter employment. On the whole, these results are consistent with
those found by Fortin et al. (1999b) using different data and econometric estimators and
are also consistent to some extent with those of Gritz (1993) and Bonnal et al. (1997). In all
three cases it was found that participation in government-sponsored training programs had
detrimental effects on the labour market experience of young men. It has been suggested
that potential employers may stigmatize participation in such training programs. Because
these programs are designed to improve the labour market opportunities of disadvantaged
workers, participation in the later may be taken as a signal of unsatisfactory performance in
previous employment. Our results indicate that training while on welfare is detrimental to
men, but training while on unemployment does not convey the same negative signal.
4.3.3 Exits from employment
The next panel of the table reports results relating to transitions from employment. Once
again, most parameters estimates that are statistically significant have the expected sign.
In particular, increases in the minimum wage rate is found to increase the likelihood of
leaving employment for either welfare training, and to diminish considerably the likelihood of
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entering a new job or moving into welfare. Increases in welfare benefits are found to increase
the transitions into welfare and to decrease the likelihood of entering welfare training.
The parameter estimates associated with the unemployment rate has the expected sign except
perhaps with respect to transitions between employment and unemployment. Indeed, the
parameter estimate implies that whenever the unemployment rate increases, workers are less
likely to leave employment to enter unemployment. There are several potential explanations
for this result. First, it may well be that when the labour market deteriorates, workers who
loose their job have difficulty qualify for UI benefits. Recall from Table 1 that the unconditional
mean job duration is approximately 18 weeks, which is roughly equal to the qualifying period.
They are thus more likely to turn to welfare, as indicated in the first column of the panel.
Second, the deterioration of the labour market may induce some to hold on to their current
job longer. The fact that all the parameter estimates are negative, except for welfare, is
consistent with this possibility. Finally, increases in welfare benefits increase the transitions
from employment to welfare, as expected.
The training variables show interesting results. For instance, those who have participated
in welfare training are more likely to enter either welfare or welfare training upon exiting
employment, although recent participation makes them less likely to enter welfare anew.
Likewise, participation in welfare training translates into less employment–employment
transitions. Those who were in UI training just prior to their current employment spell are
muchmore likely to return to UI upon leaving employment andmuch less likely to experience
an employment-employment transition. The likelihood of entering the OLF state following
employment decreases substantially if the individual experienced either UI or welfare training
in the past.
4.3.4 Exits from OLF
The results presented in the following panel relate to the OLF state. Recall that this
state includes individuals that are truly out of the labour force but may also include
full-time students and non-entitled unemployed workers. Caution must thus be exercised
in interpreting these results.
Surprisingly many parameter estimates turn out to be statistically significant. Of particular
interest, transitions from OLF to employment appear to be quite sensitive to the economic
environment. Transitions to employment are thus less when the minimum wage rate or
the welfare benefits increase. Similarly, the transitions into welfare and welfare training are
relatively sensitive to policy variables. As in previous panels, the transitions into welfare
training are more likely for those who have previously experienced such training.
For the sake of brevity, the estimation results for training programs are not presented but
are available upon request. The econometric model generally does a poorer job at predicting
transitions from the training programs compared to those for other states of the labourmarket,
although a number of parameter estimates are statistically significant.
4.3.5 Unobserved heterogeneity
Table 5 reports the value of the likelihood function for a number of different specifications
as well as the parameter estimates related to the unobserved heterogeneity of each. As
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No Het Non-Para Log-Normal Weibull Weibull Weibull
2 Factors 2 Factors 3 Factors
Probability 0.614†
ω1 -1.866
†
ω2 -2.364
†
b2 -0.116 -0.221 -0.365 -0.184 -2.980†
b3 3.757† 7.781† 8.304† 8.209† 8.173†
b4 2.337† 5.455† 6.201† 6.037† 8.879†
b5 1.323 0.447 0.244 -1.091 -1.691
b6 2.585† 5.493† 6.432† 6.168† 7.722†
b7 -1.180† -2.501† -2.938† -2.876† -4.902†
b′1 2.768
†
b′2 3.093
†
b′3 -7.131
†
b′4 0.333
b′5 -8.563
†
b′6 -0.437
b′7 0.738
†
µ -1.629†
σ -0.566†
λ 9.493† 9.057† 14.685†
γ 0.163† 0.147† 0.216†
Log-likelihood -150668.6 -149774.2 -149847.8 -149818.9 -149474.8 149422.6
Table 5. Heterogeneity Parameters
†Statistically significant at 5%
‡Statistically significant at 10%
mentioned earlier, the slope parameters of these specifications are sufficiently similar to omit
them from the tables.16
The first specification of the table does not control for unobserved heterogeneity and is thus
a special case of all the other specifications. A simple likelihood-ratio test strongly rejects
the first specification in favour of any specification that includes unobserved heterogeneity.
The second specification is a standard non-parametric two-factor loading model and was
presented in equation (4). Most parameter estimates are statistically significant, except for
b2 and b5 which concern transitions into welfare training programs and UI training programs,
respectively. Accordingly, these estimates suggest there is little, if any, selectivity into these
two training programs.
The third column of the table reports the parameter estimates of a parametric two-factor
loading model. As was mentioned earlier, the weibull distribution function was preferred
over all other distribution functions that were investigated. Notice that as in the
non-parametric specification, only b2 and b5 are not statistically significant. The last two
lines of the table report the parameter estimates of the weibull distribution, λ and γ.17
Finally, the last column of the table presents the parameter estimates of the three-factor
16 Bonnal et al. (1997) also found the slope parameters to be relatively insensitive to the distributional
assumptions of the unobserved heterogeneity variables. In their work, they compare a two-factor
loading model with a finite number of points of support with a single-factor loading model that draws
heterogeneity terms from an i.i.d. IN(0, 1) distribution. The insensitivity of the slope parameters to
the distributional assumption is consistent with the results of Heckman & Singer (1984) using single
durations data.
17 The weibull distribution function of a random variable x is given by F(x) = 1− exp [−λxγ].
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Welfare Welf. Tr. JRP UI UI Tr. Employ. OLF
TWO-FACTOR LOADING MODEL – NON-PARAMETRIC
Welfare 1.000 -0.157 0.982 0.954 0.875 0.962 -0.850
(0.195) (0.010) (0.010) (0.236) (0.007) (0.023)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 0.035 0.145 0.340 0.118 0.653
(0.200) (0.197) (0.495) (0.196) (0.150)
JRP 1.000 0.994 0.952 0.997 -0.734
(0.006) (0.151) (0.004) (0.051)
UI 1.000 0.980 1.000 -0.654
(0.098) (0.001) (0.052)
UI Tr. 1.000 0.974 -0.489
(0.111) (0.430)
Emplo. 1.000 -0.675
(0.048)
TWO-FACTOR LOADING MODEL – LOG-NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
Welfare 1.000 -0.216 0.992 0.984 0.408 0.984 -0.929
(0.263) (0.004) (0.004) (1.680) (0.004) (0.015)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 -0.089 -0.036 0.803 -0.037 0.563
(0.271) (0.272) (1.108) (0.272) (0.221)
JRP 1.000 0.999 0.521 0.999 -0.874
(0.002) (1.571) (0.002) (0.029)
U.I. 1.000 0.566 1.000 -0.846
(1.516) (0.000) (0.032)
UI Tr. 1.000 0.565 -0.040
(1.518) (1.841)
Emplo. 1.000 -0.847
(0.031)
Table 6. Correlations Between Heterogeneity Variables
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
loading model (see equation(6)), whose slope parameters were presented in Table 4. A simple
log-likelihood ratio test rejects the two-factor loading model in favour of the three-factor
loading model. Contrary to the two previous specifications, b2 is now highly statistically
significant. Furthermore, nearly all the b′j parameters are statistically significant. This suggests
that the richer specification may be better suited to uncover selection into the different states.
In order to investigate this issue, Table 6 reports the correlation coefficients between the
heterogeneity variables that are implicit in each specification along with their standard errors.
The first two panels focus on the non-parametric and the weibull two-factor loading models.
Recall that these correlation coefficients indicate the extent to which one is as likely to enter
state j as state k upon leaving any given state. While a number of coefficients are similar across
both panels, there are significant differences. To start with, the first line of each panel shows
that high transition rates into welfare are associated with lower transition rates into welfare
training and higher rates into unemployment. On the other hand, both panels disagree
significantly with respect to the correlations between welfare training and the other states, as
well as between JRP and other states. The non-parametric model implies that welfare training
and UI training are positively correlated whereas the opposite holds true in the parametric
model. Similarly, the top panel indicates that JRP is positively correlated to all other states on
the labour market, contrary to the parametric model which shows no such relations.
The last panel of Table 6 focuses on the correlation coefficients implicit in the three-factor
loading model. Each section of the panel is related to the correlation coefficients in equations
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Welfare Welf. Tr. JRP UI UI Tr. Employ. OLF
TWO-FACTOR LOADING MODEL
WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION - NO DUMMY INDICATORS
Welfare 1.000 -0.343 0.993 0.987 0.237 0.988 -0.947
(0.266) (0.004) (0.004) (2.413) (0.003) (0.012)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 -0.228 -0.189 0.832 -0.195 0.627
(0.278) (0.281) (1.390) (0.280) (0.218)
JRP 1.000 0.999 0.351 0.999 -0.901
(0.001) (2.325) (0.001) (0.026)
U.I. 1.000 0.388 1.000 -0.883
(2.288) (0.027)
UI Tr. 1.000 0.383 0.089
(2.294) (2.475)
Emplo. 1.000 -0.886
(0.026)
TWO-FACTOR LOADING MODEL
WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION - WITH DUMMY INDICATORS
Welfare 1.000 -0.181 0.993 0.987 -0.737 0.987 -0.945
(0.337) (0.004) (0.004) (0.943) (0.003) (0.013)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 -0.061 -0.018 0.798 -0.021 0.494
(0.341) (0.344) (0.872) (0.344) (0.296)
JRP 1.000 0.999 -0.650 0.999 -0.898
(0.002) (1.062) (0.001) (0.027)
U.I. 1.000 -0.617 1.000 -0.878
(1.098) (0.000) (0.028)
UI Tr. 1.000 -0.619 0.918
(1.096) (0.552)
Emplo. 1.000 -0.880
(0.027)
Table 6. (Continued)
Correlations Between Heterogeneity Variables
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
(7)–(9), respectively. Hence, the first section has the same interpretation as the correlations of
the previous panels. The correlation coefficients reported in this section differ considerably
from the previous ones. According to the estimates, it now appears that there is considerable
selectivity into welfare training as well as in JRP. Indeed, those who are more likely to
participate in the former are also more likely to train under JRP and to find employment.
On the other hand, higher transition rates into JRP or welfare training is now associated with
lower transition rates into UI and UI training. This is in stark contrast with the previous
results. Other correlation coefficients are relatively similar to the previous ones.
The second section of the panel reports the correlation coefficients with respect to the origin
states. Large heterogeneity values in the origin state translate into short spell durations.
Consequently, the correlations reflect the frequency with which individuals transit across the
various states. The estimates show that individuals who are more likely to have long welfare
spells are also likely to have short employment spells. The same holds with respect to welfare
training and employment, as well as JRP and employment. Those who are more likely to have
short unemployment spells are more likely to have long JRP, welfare training or UI training
spells.
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Welfare Welf. Tr. JRP UI UI Tr. Employ. OLF
CORRELATION BETWEEN DESTINATION STATES
Welfare 1.000 -0.948 0.993 0.994 -0.861 0.992 -0.980
(0.026) (0.006) (0.002) (0.568) (0.002) (0.007)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 -0.902 -0.906 0.978 -0.899 0.992
(0.042) (0.038) (0.232) (0.040) (0.007)
JRP 1.000 0.998 -0.792 0.998 -0.948
(0.001) (0.682) (0.000) (0.020)
UI 1.000 -0.798 0.999 -0.951
(0.672) (0.001) (0.014)
UI Tr. 1.000 -0.788 0.945
(0.687) (0.363)
Emplo. 1.000 -0.946
(0.015)
CORRELATION BETWEEN ORIGIN STATES
Welfare 1.000 0.951 -0.990 0.316 -0.993 -0.401 0.594
(0.027) (0.006) (0.756) (0.006) (0.369) (0.197)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 -0.900 0.592 -0.909 -0.099 0.812
(0.046) (0.622) (0.045) (0.374) (0.123)
JRP 1.000 -0.181 1.000 0.524 -0.476
(0.784) (0.002) (0.346) (0.223)
U.I. 1.000 -0.204 0.743 0.951
(0.782) (0.467) (0.225)
UI Tr. 1.000 0.504 -0.496
(0.350) (0.221)
Emplo. 1.000 0.500
(0.310)
CORRELATION BETWEEN ORIGIN-DESTINATION STATES
Welfare 1.000 0.951 -0.990 0.316 -0.993 -0.401 0.594
(0.027) (0.006) (0.756) (0.006) (0.369) (0.197)
Wel. Tr. -0.948 -0.902 0.939 -0.299 0.942 0.380 -0.563
(0.026) (0.044) (0.028) (0.720) (0.028) (0.345) (0.197)
JRP 0.993 0.944 -0.983 0.313 -0.986 -0.398 0.589
(0.006) (0.028) (0.009) (0.751) (0.009) (0.367) (0.196)
UI 0.994 0.946 -0.984 0.314 -0.987 -0.398 0.590
(0.002) (0.028) (0.007) (0.751) (0.007) (0.367) (0.196)
UI Tr. -0.861 -0.819 0.852 -0.272 0.855 0.345 -0.511
(0.568) (0.544) (0.563) (0.725) (0.565) (0.367) (0.395)
Emplo. 0.992 0.944 -0.982 0.313 -0.985 -0.397 0.589
(0.002) (0.028) (0.007) (0.750) (0.007) (0.366) (0.196)
OLF -0.980 -0.932 0.970 -0.309 0.973 0.392 -0.582
(0.007) (0.031) (0.010) (0.742) (0.010) (0.360) (0.196)
Table 6. (Continued) Correlations Between Heterogeneity Variables
Three-Factor Loading Model
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
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The last section of the panel reports the implicit correlations between the origin and the
destination states. Note that the correlation matrix need not be symmetric nor does the
diagonal need be equal to unity. On the other hand, the restrictions that were imposed to
achieve identification of the loading parameters imply that the first row of the matrix is equal
to the first row of the matrix of the middle section.
For the sake of brevity we will focus our attention on the most interesting correlations. The
estimates suggest that those who are likely to have short welfare training spells are also less
likely to transit throughwelfare or JRP andmore likely to enter employment (row 2). Similarly,
row 3 indicates that individuals who are likely to have short JRP spells are less likely to return
to either welfare or welfare training in the future, and much more likely to enter employment.
Finally, those who have short UI training spells (row 5) have higher transitions rates into
welfare and welfare training, and lower transitions rates into employment.
These correlations suggest there is considerable selectivity into the training programs.
Furthermore, they show that those who are selected into welfare and JRP training programs
appear to be different from those who participate in UI training programs. As a matter of fact,
all the correlation coefficients of the last section of the panel pertaining to UI training have
the opposite sign to those of welfare and JRP training. Consider, for example, those who have
unexpectedly long UI training spells and those who have unexpectedly short welfare training
or JRP spells. According to the last section of the panel, all these individuals are more likely
to move into employment upon exiting their respective spells than average. Yet, the middle
section indicates that only those onwelfare training or JRP are likely to have long employment
spells. Those who were on UI training are more likely to have short employment spells.
That those who are likely to have short JRP or welfare training spells are more likely to
experiment long employment spells may be somewhat surprising. In fact, when studying the
impact of the Youth Training Scheme in the UK,Mealli et al. (1996) andMealli & Pudney (2003)
conjectured that early program termination may result from more intensive search stemming
from better than average motivation. Hence, early termination may be associated with a
higher probability of transition into employment and longer employment spells. Conversely,
if failure to complete the full term is a consequence of low ability and motivation, it may be
associated with poorer employment outcomes. Although we have no information regarding
program completion, our results are consistent with the first possibility, whereas those of
Mealli et al. (1996) were consistent with the second possibility.
5. Conclusion
The analysis has focused on an examination of the impact of government-sponsored training
programs aimed at disadvantaged male youths on their labour market transitions. We have
elected to concentrate our attention on this group since they have fared relatively poorly on
the labour market over the past decade in Canada by all accounts. The richness of the data
at our disposal has allowed us to recreate very detailed individual histories over a relatively
long period. As many as seven distinct states on the labour market could be identified in the
data.
This study has applied a continuous time duration model to estimate the density of duration
times in these seven states, controlling for the endogeneity of an individual’s training status.
Most previous studies have used survey or administrative data that were less amenable
to the kind of analysis performed in this chapter. Depending on the nature of the data,
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complex adjustments to the model were often required to account for potential problems
related to stock sampling and initial conditions. Fortunately, we were able to avoid these
difficulties by recreating each individual’s history as early as age 16, the legal school-leaving
age in Canada. Consequently, the initial state can be safely considered exogenous, and the
subsequent duration times void of any form of bias.
There is no consensus in the literature concerning the appropriate treatment of unobserved
heterogeneity in multi-states multi-episodes duration models. When few states are
considered, two-factor loading models with a finite set of points of support have become
relatively standard. When the analysis focuses on more states, factor loading models require a
large number of parameters to be flexible or become relatively restrictive if a parsimonious
specification is used. In this chapter we have chosen to investigate the sensitivity of the
parameter estimates by comparing a typical non-parametric specification and a series of
parametric two-factor loading models. These models implicitly assume that the intensity
of transitions are related to the state of destination. We have also estimated a parametric
three-factor loading model. The novelty of this specification lies in the fact that the intensities
of transitions are related to both to the state of destination and the state of origin.
The estimation of the model yields a number of interesting results. As found in previous
studies, unobserved heterogeneity appears to play an important role in determining who
selects or gets selected in training programs. On the other hand, the slope and baseline hazard
parameter estimates are not very sensitive to the choice of a particular distribution function
for the unobserved heterogeneity variables. The two-factor loading models, either parametric
or non-parametric, yield essentially the same results as the three-factor loading model. These
show that the duration times in any of the seven states considered are sensitive to variations
in program parameters such as welfare benefits, policy variables such as the minimum wage
rate, and in the economic environment as proxied by the unemployment rate. Nearly all the
parameter estimates have the expected sign when statistically significant.
The results pertaining to the impact of the welfare training programs and JRP are similar
to those found earlier by Gritz (1993), Bonnal et al. (1997) and Fortin et al. (1999a). In
essence, young, poorly educated males who participate in these programs do not fair as well
on the labour market compared to non-participants, even after controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity. On the other hand, participation in training programs while on unemployment
insurance provides them some benefits in the form of increased transitions into employment.
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